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PARK AND RECREATIONAL PURPOSES
The Home Builders Association of Greater
Kansas City v. City of Kansas City'
In 1973 the Chas. S. Bordner Construction Company applied for
the recordation of a subdivision plant known as Woodson Estates Exten-
sion.2 The City of Kansas City, Missouri, had in effect an ordinance
which provided, as a condition of final subdivision approval, that the
developer dedicate to the city nine percent of the merchantable land for
park purposes. s This ordinance was enacted by the city pursuant to
state statute empowering municipalities to adopt regulations governing
the subdivision of land. The statute specifically permitted municipalities
to require subdividers to dedicate "adequate open spaces ... for recrea-
tion, light and air." 4 The Board of Park and Recreation Commissioners
selected a 5.1 acre park site on Bordner's plat. Bordner refused to dedi-
cate this parcel of land and instead offered 11.94 acres at another loca-
tion or a cash payment in lieu of dedication. Neither alternative was
acceptable to the City Plan Commission and approval of Woodson Es-
tates Extension was denied.
The Home Builders Association of Greater Kansas City, along with
individual subdividers, brought a class action suit against the City of
Kansas City. The Association challenged the constitutionality of the
mandatory dedication ordinance and sought declaratory and injunctive
relief.' The Circuit Court of Jackson County held the ordinance uncon-
stitutional and stated:
[The] fixed percentage dedication requirement of Sec. 31.32(A)
is an arbitrary requirement unsupported by any showing of
necessity, and as such constitutes a taking of [respondent's]
property without just compensation in violation of Article I,
Sections 10 and 26 of the Constitution of the State of Missouri
and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution
of the United States .... 6
On direct appeal the Missouri Supreme Court reversed and remanded
the case for new trial because the trial court erred in placing the burden
of justifying the ordinance on the municipality. The court said that the
1. 555 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. En Banc 1977).
2. Brief for Respondent at 6, Home Builder's Ass'n v. City of Kansas City,
555 S.W. 832 (Mo. En Banc 1977).
3. KANSAS CITY, Mo., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 31.32 (1973).
4. § 89.410, RSMo 1969.
5. 555 S.W.2d at 832.
6. Id. at 833.
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party challenging the constitutionality of an ordinance must bear the
burden of proving unreasonableness. Before reaching this holding, the
court announced in dictum 7 the following rule regarding mandatory
dedications for recreational purposes:
If the requirement is within the statutory grant of power to the
municipality and if the burden cast upon the subdivider is
reasonably attributable to his activity, then the requirement is
permissible; if not, it is forbidden and amounts to a confiscation
of private property in contravention of the constitutional pro-
hibitions rather than reasonable regulation under the police
power. Insofar as the establishment of a subdivision within a city in-
creases the recreational needs of the city, then to that extent the cost of
meeting that increase in needs may reasonably be required of the sub-
divider. 8
Since the turn of the century local governments have attempted to
restrict land utilization 9 through the imposition of subdivision controls 10
in order to guide community development and to protect prospective
residents and nearby land owners from the dangers of poorly designed
areas. One common subdivision control method is the mandatory dedi-
cation ordinance. Under such an ordinance, as a condition precedent to
plat approval, a developer must convey to the municipality an interest"
in a percentage of the area of his new subdivision.' 2  The dedicated
land then is used by the government for a public purpose. This method
is particularly advantageous to municipalities because it enables them to
acquire needed land without using public revenues.' 3 It also places the
7. Judge Finch pointed out in his dissent that the majority opinion estab-
lished the quoted phrase as the rule for Missouri even though the matter was not
raised by either party on appeal. In the interests of restraint, Finch would prefer
that such rules not be made unless there is a true adversary presentation con-
cerning the issue. 555 S.W.2d at 835-39. The author of the majority opinion
apparently was cognizant of this complaint; after announcing the Missouri rule
for mandatory park exactions, the majority stated: "We turn then to a consider-
ation of the issues in this case." Id. at 835 (emphasis added).
8. Id. (emphasis in original).
9. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
10. See generally 4 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 23.01-.48 (2d
ed. 1977); Reps, Control of Land Subdivision by Municipal Planning Boards, 40
CORNELL L.Q. 258 (1955); Comment, Land Subdivision Control, 65 HARV. L. Rv.
1226 (1952).
11. Typically, municipalities take a fee simple interest in exacted land. How-
ever, there are situations where an easement is acceptable. 4 R. ANDERSON, supra
note 10, § 23.25 at 106.
12. Various rationales have been employed by the courts to uphold these
requirements. See Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The
Quest For a Rationale, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 871, 876-87 (1967).
13. Comment, Subdivision Exactions: The Constitutional Issues, the Judicial Re-
sponse and the Pennsylvania Situation, 19 VILL. L. REv. 782, 785 (1974).
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cost of providing this land on the developer whose subdividing activities
have generated the demand for additional services.1 4
Traditionally, local governments have exacted land for streets, 15 al-
leys, sidewalks,'1 6 drainage facilities,1 7 street lights, water lines,", sewers, 19
and curbs and gutters. These improvements not only provide desired
amenities for the eventual residents, but also presumably enhance the
saleability of the tract for the developer. Thus such exactions are ac-
cepted by developers as a traditional and vital part of new subdivi-
sions.2 0  Recently, however, because of population increases, the con-
sequent rapid consumption of available land, and the overcrowding of
existing facilities, a number of communities have elected to surpass these
conventional subdivision exactions by also requiring developers to dedi-
cate land for park and school sites or to pay fees2 1 for the acquisition
and maintenance of such sites. These exactions are readily distinguish-
able from similar requirements for streets and sewers because the
amount of land involved is greater, and because parks and schools nor-
mally benefit the community at large, not merely the new neighborhood.
The subject of much litigation has been the question whether the
imposition of a particular land use control amounts to a taking of private
14. Comment, Subdivision Land Dedications: Objectives and Objections, 27 STAN.
L. REv. 419, 432 (1975).
15. See, e.g., Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
16. See, e.g., Allen v. Stockwell, 210 Mich. 488, 178 N.W. 27 (1920).
17. See, e.g., City of Buena Park v. Boyar, 186 Cal. App. 2d 61, 8 Cal. Rptr.
674 (1960).
18. See, e.g., Zastrow v. Village of Brown Deer, 9 Wis. 2d 100, 100 N.W.2d
359 (1960).
19. See, e.g., Medine v. Burns, 208 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
20. See Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community
Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119,
1128-29 (1964).
21. Payments in lieu of dedication are paid by a developer to the municipal-
ity when his plat is found unsuitable for a park site because of shape, size, or
topographical conditions. The payment commonly is set at a fixed amount per
lot or as a percentage of the assessed value of all the land in the particular plat.
See, e.g., Coronado Devel. Co. v. City of McPherson, 189 Kan. 174, 368 P.2d 51
(1962); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442
(1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966). Some developers have challenged such
fees on the ground that payment in lieu of dedication constituted a taking of
property without due process of law, and that the exacting municipalities lacked
statutory authority to demand money. The courts, however, generally have up-
held reasonable in lieu payments as long as the exacted amounts are placed in a
fund expressly set aside for acquiring land for parks, playgrounds, and other
recreational facilities. See, e.g., Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78,
271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 218 N.E.2d 673 (1966). See generally, 4 R. ANDERSON, supra
note 10, § 23.40. A Connecticut court has held that exacting fees in lieu of dedi-
cation is invalid if the proceeds are not kept by the municipality in a fund lim-
ited solely to the future recreational needs of the paying subdivision. See Aunt
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property for public use for which the fifth amendment of the United
States Constitution requires the payment of 'just compensation,' 22 or
whether such a control is merely a regulation for which no compensation
is constitutionally required. When the government constructs a highway
through private property or builds a levee that floods neighboring
land,23 courts uniformly have said that "taking" has occurred.2 4 The
government is acting as a proprietor in acquiring private property for a
public purpose and therefore must condemn the land and pay the land-
owner its fair market value. On the other hand, when the government
prohibits the operation of a particular business in an urban area 25 or
restricts permissible building heights,26 no compensation is constitution-
ally required. In those instances the government is said to be merely
"regulating" to prevent the use of property in a manner that is detri-
mental to the public interest. When it regulates, the government does
not gain private property for itself; it simply denies the owner the unre-
stricted use and enjoyment of his property.2 7
When it is clear that the government is acting as a proprietor by
acquiring private property for a public purpose, or it is clear that the
government is merely regulating land use, the courts have had little dif-
ficulty deciding in which situations compensation should be paid. How-
ever, the effects of some land use controls usually cannot be so easily
categorized. Mandatory park dedications, for example, do not fit into
either category. When a governmental entity exacts land for a park site,
it is appropriating private property for a public purpose. Unlike con-
ventional takings, however, it is not acting as a proprietor by initiating
the acquisition. It is the developer who has taken the initiative by sub-
mitting his plat for recordation. As a result, the mandatory dedication of
land for park purposes at best amounts to a hybrid form of taking. United
States Supreme Court decisions in the land use control area have yielded
inconsistent and frequently contradictory rationales for distinguishing per-
missible regulation from prohibited taking. 28 Consequently, there exists little
guidance for lower courts.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This principle has been made applicable to the
states by incorporation in the fourteenth amendment. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v.
City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
23. Hollingsworth v. Parish of Tensas, 17 F. 109 (W.D. La. 1883); Hansen v.
Hammer, 15 Wash. 315, 46 P. 332 (1896).
24. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
25. See, e.g., Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (livery sta-
ble); Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878) (fertilizer
plant).
26. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
27. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 658-59 (1887); Petterson v. City of
Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
28. The Supreme Court has employed three discernible approaches to de-
termine what constitutes a taking. The first is the simplistic "physical invasion"
test-if a state asserts a proprietary interest for itself in private property, there is
1978] 585
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Professor Sax has suggested an unorthodox but highly useful ap-
proach for determining the definition of a taking.29 Sax would divide
government activities into two categories, entrepreneurial and mediatory.
In the former the government attempts to enhance its own enterprises
by competing for various resources. Because the government cannot ac-
quire an asset for its own account without paying, it must compensate
individuals for their resultant economic losses. These sorts of activities
constitute a taking. In the latter the government acts in its arbitral
capacity to resolve conflicting uses between private property owners.
When the government functions as a mediator, no compensation is
necessary. Thus, under the Sax approach, the nature of the government
activity provides the basis for distinguishing between a taking and a reg-
ulation.
When the Sax test is applied to mandatory exactions for park and
recreational purposes, an interesting result is reached. A municipality
that requires a developer to dedicate a portion of his land is not
mediating between private property owners; it is acting to gain title to
land that was formerly in private hands. The government, in effect, ac-
quires resources which add to the economic status of the entire munici-
pality. Because the acquisition and maintenance of recreational facilities
is a government enterprise, compensation to the developer would be
necessary. Under the Sax approach, it appears that a subdivision exac-
tion for recreational purposes constitutes a taking.
In spite of his test,3 0 Professor Sax, along with all courts including
the Missouri Supreme Court in Home Builders,31 has treated such subdivi-
sion requirements as regulatory. 32 It has not been demonstrated clearly
why compensation should not be required for forced dedications. 33 It
a compensable taking. See, e.g., United States v. Cross, 243 U.S. 316 (1917);
Smith v. Corporation of Washington, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 135 (1857). A sub-
sequent theory is the "noxious use" test, which developed from the law of nui-
sance. It is founded on the premise that if a property use is deemed injurious to
the community, then that use can be restricted by the government without com-
pensation to the owner. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887).
The third theory, the "diminution in value" test, was first enunciated by Justice
Holmes. Under this balancing approach a taking occurs when government inter-
ference with private property causes such extensive economic harm that it out-
weighs the concomitant public benefit. See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922). Although helpful in some cases, none of the above tests has proved
to be adequately discriminating and reliable in all situations, and none is applica-
ble in the case of mandatory dedication.
29. Sax, supra note 24, at 61-67.
30. Id. at 73-74.:
31. 555 S.W.2d at 835.
32. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d
633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); Bil-
lings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964).
33. Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 20, at 1130.
[Vol. 43
5
Curran: Curran: Constitutional Law--Mandatory Subdivision Exactions
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
RECENT CASES
would appear that the courts have justified the extension of permissible
regulation to include mandatory park exactions because the developer's
loss frequently is offset by an increase in the value of the rest of his tract
due to the park or recreational land use. Additionally mandatory dedi-
cation may be the only feasible way for local governments to meet the
growing public need for recreational facilities; the cost of purchasing
large tracts of improved land would be prohibitive to most
municipalities. The public welfare, therefore, apparently has been
employed by the courts to justify the lack of compensation for affected
subdividers.
If a compulsory dedication requirement for recreational purposes is
not considered by the courts to be a taking, the question narrows to
whether such a requirement is a valid exercise of a government's reg-
ulatory power. To justify government intervention on behalf of the pub-
lic in this area, courts generally have said that the state legislature must
have provided an enabling statute specifically authorizing municipalities
to require dedications; and that the activity of the subdivider, and not
that of the entire community, has generated the need for the expanded
recreational facilities.
State courts have been reluctant to uphold mandatory park dedica-
tions in the absence of a state statute 34 expressly delegating such au-
thority to municipalities.35  The rule announced in Home Builders that a
dedication ordinance must be "within the statutory grant of power to the
municipality"36 is no exception. The existence of explicit enabling legis-
lation is important to the courts because it demonstrates the legislature's
determination that the interests of the public permit the use of this reg-
ulatory power by municipalities.
The second requirement, that the need for park exactions be gener-
ated by the activity of the particular subdivider, was instituted by the
courts to assess the reasonableness of the method through which a
municipality specifies how much land each developer should be required
to dedicate. One of the first cases to employ this reasoning was Pioneer
Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect,37 which questioned the
reasonableness of a municipal ordinance that required subdividers to
dedicate, for school and playground purposes, one acre per sixty
families.38 The Illinois Supreme Court held the ordinance invalid as to
the subdivider-plaintiff because the village had not shown to the court's
satisfaction that the needs for the educational and recreational facilities
34. Johnston, supra note 12, at 887.
35. See, e.g., Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Il1. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d
230 (1960); Coronado Devel. Co. v. City of McPherson, 189 Kan. 174, 368 P.2d
51 (1961); Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961).
36. 555 S.W.2d at 835.
37. 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
38. Id. at 377-78, 176 N.E.2d at 800.
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were "specifically and uniquely attributable" to his subdivision. 39  The
court said that dedication requirements must be tied directly to the de-
mand for services created by the new residents. Commentators have
criticized Pioneer Trust as creating an "unduly restrictive standard" for
testing the validity of municipal exactions. 40  Nevertheless, the "specifi-
cally and uniquely attributable" test has been influential in this area.41
It often may be impossible for a municipality to prove that the need
for the park or school site was generated solely by the increase in popu-
lation stimulated by a new subdivision.42 Thus, state courts have pur-
ported to follow Pioneer Trust but actually have adopted more lenient
approaches in order to uphold mandatory land dedications for recrea-
tional purposes. One example is Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone
County,43 in which the Montana Supreme Court professed to accept the
"specifically and uniquely attributable" test, but held that it was satisfied
by the legislative determination in the enabling act 44 that new subdivi-
sions create a need for park space.45 Instead of applying Pioneer Trust's
highly restrictive approach, the court established an almost irrebuttable
presumption in favor of finding a need for such exactions.
In Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls 46 a developer sued a munici-
pality to recover a fee paid in lieu of a mandatory land dedication for
recreational purposes. The Wisconsin court upheld the validity of the
dedication ordinance and agreed with the Pioneer Trust approach on the
condition that the words "specifically and uniquely attributable to the
[subdivider's] activity are not so restrictively applied as to cast an un-
reasonable burden of proof upon the municipality which has enacted the
ordinance under attack." 47  The court stated that municipalities only
have the burden of "reasonably establishing" that the need for the dedi-
cation requirement is related to the activity of the developer. 48  A
reasonable nexus between the exaction and the proposed subdivision is
thus sufficient.
The rule stated in Home Builders, that the need for the dedication
requirement must be "reasonably attributable" to the activity of the de-
veloper, follows this trend away from the rigid structures of the Pioneer
39. Id. at 379-80, 176 N.E.2d at 801-02.
40. E.g., Johnston, supra note 12, at 911.
41. See, e.g., Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 160 Conn.
109, 273 A.2d 880 (1970); Frank C. Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 107 R.I.
63, 264 A.2d 910 (1970).
42. See Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 617, 137
N.W.2d 442, 447 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
43. 144 Mont. 25, 35, 394 P.2d 182, 188 (1964).
44. MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 11-602(9) (1957).
45. 144 Mont. at 35, 394 P.2d at 188.
46. 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4
(1966).
47. Id. at 617, 137 N.W.2d at 447.
48. Id. at 618, 137 N.W.2d at 448.
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Trust test. Under this rule, in order to enforce a specific exaction, it is
unnecessary for the municipality to prove that the required dedication
for a park site is to meet a need solely generated by the influx into the
community of people who will occupy this particular subdivision. Beyond
the mere statement of a rule, however, the court in Home Builders pro-
vided little guidance as to the interpretation of the "reasonably attributa-
ble" standard. The court did mention its earlier decision in State ex rel.
Noland v. St. Louis County,49 where it invalidated a requirement that, as a
precondition to approval of a subdivision plat, the developer relocate a
new road and widen and pave an old road. The Noland decision was
based on the local government's failure to show that the requirements
were reasonably related to the activity of this subdivider. 50  The court
found that the new subdivision would not create such additional traffic
volume as would warrant the proposed street improvements. The need
for the required improvements was generated by the community as a
whole and not only by this subdivision. If the Home Builders rule is
applied in the same manner as the Noland standard, specific instances of
mandatory park dedications presumably will be upheld if the municipal-
ity can establish a reasonable connection between its required exaction
and the recreational needs created by the proposed neighborhood. On
the other hand, if a developer can prove that the community as a whole,
and not merely his new subdivision, has generated these needs, the dedi-
cation requirement as to him would be invalidated.
In order for a municipality to establish that its park exactions are
reasonably attributable to the activity of the subdivider, the services of a
city planning expert could prove useful. Such an expert could provide
evidence on the amount of recreational space per family needed in the
community to provide a proper environment for human habitation. A
municipal government then could correlate this figure with the amount
of recreational facilities generated by previously approved subdivisions in
the area. From such information a theoretical formula relating need to
exaction could be developed; the formula could be used to estimate the
amount of recreational space necessary to meet the demands of the an-
ticipated influx of people to the new subdivision. In the absence of con-
travening evidence, the use of such a formula would go a long way to-
ward meeting the reasonably attributable criterion of the Home Builders
rule.
A municipality with an ordinance specifying a fixed percentage
dedication requirement may have difficulty meeting this test. The City of
Kansas City, for example, enacted a nine percent exaction rate. It could
be argued that such a requirement is unreasonable. Nine percent of- the
merchantable land may be proper in some situations and wholly impro-
49. 478 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1972).
50. Id. at 367.
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per in others. Alternatively, the Kansas City ordinance 51 also provides
that the city can exact platted land for park space at the rate of four
acres per one hundred living units.52  Such a provision is an improve-
ment on a fixed percentage dedication requirement because it is based
on population density rather than total area. In given instances, how-
ever, it might also be invalid. For example, a park exaction of four acres
per one hundred living units could be found not reasonably attributable
to the activity of the subdivider in the case of a proposed retirement
village where the recreational need of the residents might be considera-
bly less than that of a subdivision of traditional single family dwellings.
The particulars of the individual case should dictate the result.
Once a municipal government has established the judicially required
nexus between its exaction and the needs of the proposed subdivision,
the burden of producing evidence would shift to the developer to dem-
onstrate why the particular dedication requirement should not be
applied to his land. As contravening evidence, a developer could show
that the growth of the entire community would have necessitated ac-
quiring additional park space regardless of the increase in population
caused by his new subdivision.53 Another strategy might be to offer
evidence that the municipality already has sufficient recreational facilities
to meet the needs of future subdivisions including that of the developer.
Additionally, the nature of the builder's project or the physical condition
and age of the intended residents could present variables which would
justify an argument that a specific exaction standard should not be
applied. In such instances it would be unfair to force a developer to bear
the total expense of providing a park site.
The court's declaration in Home Builders, that a mandatory subdivi-
sion exaction for recreational purposes would be upheld if enacted pur-
suant to the enabling statute 54 and if the recreational need to be met by
the dedication is reasonably attributable to the activity of the subdivider,
provides a progressive and workable rationale for such cases. It assures
that local legislation, if reasonable and conducive to state planning ob-
jectives, will not be invalidated. At the same time, by allowing for the
introduction of contravening evidence, it is broad enough in scope to
protect developers from arbitrary or excessive municipal requirements.
This rule places a heavy burden on municipalities to demonstrate a
reasonable relationship between specific recreational exactions and the
51. KANSAS CITY, Mo., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 31.32(a) (1973).
52. The ordinance contains no standards for determining which alternative is
to be applied to an individual subdivision.
53. Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442
(1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
54. § 89.410, RSMo 1969.
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